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Abstract
Monetary policy is usually perceived as an important transmission channel in the negative
relationship between oil prices and economic performance. It may also constitute a short-term
explanation of the non-linearity in this relationship, since Central Bankers may be more sensitive
to the potential inflationary threats entailed by high oil price increases than to small increases or
decreases. In this paper, we use an extended Taylor rule to investigate the role of oil prices in
the ECB monetary policy strategy. A contemporaneous reaction function is estimated using both
a GMM framework and an Ordered Probit model, and several oil indicators are constructed and
tested. The main results suggest that oil prices play a key role in the ECB interest-rate setting,
since it appears as a relevant indicator of future inflation. However, the ECB seems to react
asymmetrically: only oil price increases influence its decision setting, not oil prices decreases.
Monetary policy may thus transmit and amplify the asymmetry in the relationship between oil
prices and activity in the euro area. Further investigations suggest that a preference for price
stability provides an important explanation of this asymmetric behaviour of the ECB.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy is usually perceived as an important transmission mechanism in the relationship
between oil prices and output: when oil prices go up, inflationary pressures may lead the Central Bank
to raise its short-term interest rate. This contractionary reaction of monetary policy would then have
negative effects on aggregate demand and the economic activity. Another negative side is attributed to
monetary policy: it may transmit and strengthen the asymmetry in the oil price-activity relationship.
The Central Bank should indeed be differently sensitive to oil prices increases or decreases, and
monetary policy would in turn be more restrictive when energy prices go up than convenient when
prices fall.
Most papers dealing with the potential role of monetary policy in the transmission of oil shocks
to GDP have indeed focused on the United States and the behaviour of the Federal Reserve. Romer
& Romer (1989) are among the first to analyse the possibility of a confusion between the effects of
monetary policy shocks and oil shocks on real output. They show, using the "narrative approach" of
Friedman & Schwartz (1963), that real fluctuations are mainly driven by monetary considerations, if
the potential effects of oil shocks on monetary policy are taken into account by eliminating the mone-
tary shocks which followed the big oil shocks of the seventies. Dotsey & Reid (1992) and Hoover &
Perez (2004) criticize Romer and Romer’s work, underlying the lack of distinction between the effects
of oil prices increases and the consequences of monetary policy. Hoover & Perez (2004) explain that
there is a "post hoc ergo propter hoc" problem. Those two papers show that oil price shocks have as
much or more impact on industrial production and unemployment than monetary shocks. However,
these studies compare the effects of monetary shocks and oil shocks without assessing the nature and
the size of the relationship between them. Bohi (1989) is one of the first to argue that the recessions
that followed oil price shocks were caused not by oil shocks themselves but rather by the contrac-
tionary reaction of the U.S. Federal Reserve. In the same way, Bernanke, Gertler & Watson (1997)
(BGW thereafter) investigate the influence of the systematic reaction of the Fed monetary policy in the
U.S. economy (using a VAR modelling) and conclude that the upward movements of the Fed Funds
rates explain to a large extent the low economic growth observed after oil shocks. They claim that
a counter-inflation monetary policy is systematically harmful, and that a "neutral monetary policy"
could avert the contractionary response to oil shocks. Hamilton & Herrera (2004) refute the conclu-
sions of BGW and alleviate the responsibility of monetary policy in the transmission of oil shocks to
activity. According to them, the direct impact of rising oil prices on output is underestimated because
of a bad specification of the model and a misleading perception of the monetary policy driven by
the Federal Reserve. However, Leduc & Sill (2004) demonstrate, in a calibrated general equilibrium
model, that monetary policy may contribute to nearly 40 percent to the drop in output following a rise
in oil prices. The Central Bank can not fully insulate real output from an oil price shock, and the real
effects thus vary depending on the priority assigned by the monetary authority.
Regarding the potential asymmetric effects of monetary policy in the oil prices-activity relation-
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ship, the articles from Huntington (1998) with OLS regressions and Balke, Brown & Yücel (2002) in
a VAR framework introduce asymmetric measures of oil prices to study their effect on the U.S. econ-
omy. Both studies admit the role played by monetary policy in the transmission of the asymmetry,
since interest rates react differently to oil price increases and decreases. But they also suggest that this
effect of monetary policy should not be over-estimated, and they rather insist on factors such as rigidi-
ties in the transmission from crude oil prices to refinery products’ prices, or structural adjustments
between sectors.
In this paper, we investigate the potential transmission effect of monetary policy in the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) from an empirical point of view, using estimates of an extended Taylor
rule to evaluate the sensitivity of the European Central Bank (ECB) with regard to oil prices fluctua-
tions. The aim of our paper is thus similar to Hess (2000) who estimate an extended Taylor rule with
oil prices for the United States during three distinct sub-periods corresponding to Pre-Volcker, Volcker
and Greenspan eras. However, the originality of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we focus on the euro
area and the behaviour of the ECB, whereas most of the literature about the relationships between
oil prices, monetary policy and economic activity deals with the U.S. case. Secondly, we construct
several indicators of oil prices to assess whether the effect of oil prices in the ECB interest-rate setting
process is asymmetric and/or nonlinear. To this end, we pay particular attention to a breaking down
into oil price increases and decreases, and we also use another indicator called Net Oil Price Increase
(NOPI) initiated by Hamilton (1996). Thirdly, we check the robustness of our conclusions by com-
paring the results reached using a GMM estimator and an Ordered Probit model. Finally, we assess
two potential explanations: the role of oil prices on inflation expectations versus the preferences of
the European authorities about the inflation rate.
Our results suggest that oil prices play a key role in the ECB interest-rate setting, since it ap-
pears as a relevant indicator of future inflation. However, the ECB seems to react asymmetrically:
it strongly reacts to inflationary pressures following an oil shock, while its reaction to oil price de-
creases is very limited. Then it appears that, even if the ECB does not generate the asymmetry in the
relationship between oil prices and activity, monetary policy is an important channel of transmission
and amplification of the asymmetric link between crude oil prices and the aggregate price level. An
inflation bias in the ECB’s preferences would lead policymakers to behave in an asymmetric way
regarding oil prices.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 comes back briefly on the relationship between oil
prices and monetary policy, with some theoretical elements and stylised facts. Section 3 deals with
the estimation of the contemporaneous Taylor rule using a GMM framework, while Section 4 presents
the results reached with an Ordered Probit model. Section 5 evaluates two potential explanations for
the observed asymmetry in the ECB’s reaction to oil prices. Finally, Section 6 concludes and provides
the insights for future works.
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2 The relationship between oil prices and monetary policy: The-
oretical aspects and some stylised facts
The relationship between oil prices and interest rates is rather intuitive: a Central Bank that is designed
to maintain price stability should react to the inflationary pressures entailed by oil price increases by
raising its interest rate. Actually, when energy prices are rising, the consumer price level is likely to
be affected rather quickly in two ways: directly via the prices of refined products (gasoline, kerosene)
which are included in the consumer price index, and indirectly through the production costs which
pass through to the selling prices of final goods and services. As an example, the IMF estimated in
2005 that a rise to 80 USD per barrel1 would increase CPI inflation by 1.3% in the US and 0.9% in
the Euro Area, Japan, and the United-Kingdom.
The second transmission channel from oil prices to CPI may obviously generate some "second-
round effects" which are the ground for a wage-inflation spiral. Indeed, workers may want to adjust
their nominal wages to rising oil prices and to the general price level in order to maintain their real
wages. That’s why the transmission of rising oil price to inflation also depends on the strength and
speed of this spiral: the potential effects on inflation are closely related to the nominal rigidities
stressed by Mork, Olsen & Mysen (1994). The less rigid the adjustment of real wages is, the larger
inflationary pressures would be. For instance, Hooker (2002), using a Phillips Curve framework, finds
a less evident pass-through of oil prices to inflation since around 1980. He claims that the first-round
effect of oil prices on the overall price level is the only remaining transmission channel, and he argues
that there is few room for a wage-price spiral.
Nevertheless, the Board of the ECB seems very doubtful of Hooker’s conclusions, according to
recurrent speeches from the Board’s members (especially its President Jean-Claude Trichet) and state-
ments reported in the Editorial of the ECB Monthly Bulletin2. The ECB stresses that oil price devel-
opments are an important part of the "economic analysis" component of its monetary policy strategy.
It pays particular attention to the likelihood of second-round effects and a wage-price inflation spiral
stemming from rising oil prices.
However, we must stress that oil shocks have all the features of a typical supply shock, and thus
have opposite effects on inflation and output. If the Central Bank has a twofold objective of fighting
1At this time, in January, the price of the barrel was about 45 USD.
2An example among many others is provided in an article devoted to oil prices in the ECB Monthly Bulletin from
November 2004: "The oil price increase has already had a significant direct impact on euro area inflation. Against this
background, monetary policy has to ensure that this direct effect does not fuel inflationary expectations and has to remain
vigilant against the emergence of second-round effects" (p. 51). A more recent example is extracted from the Editorial of
the January 2008 Monthly Bulletin: "This confirms the strong upward pressure on inflation in the short term, stemming
mainly from strong increases in oil and food prices in recent months" [. . . ] "These risks include the possibility that stronger
than currently expected wage growth may emerge, taking into account capacity constraints and the positive developments
in labour markets. It is imperative that all parties concerned meet their responsibilities and that second-round effects on
wage and price-setting stemming from current inflation rates be avoided" (p. 5-6).
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inflation and stabilizing activity, an oil shock would entail a potential trade-off in interest-rate setting,
because a restrictive reaction designed to curb inflation would conflict with the objective of reaching
the potential level of economic growth. The reaction of the Central Bank would therefore depend
critically on the relative weights given to price stability and economic activity. Since the ECB has
a primary objective of price stability, we would expect the ECB to react strongly and rather quickly
to oil price developments by adjusting its key interest rate. On the other hand, the U.S. Federal
Reserve might be less reactive to such oil shocks given its twofold objective of price stability and
output stabilization, even though several articles such as Carlstrom & Fuerst (2006) conclude that the
conduct of monetary policy has successfully contained inflationary pressures generated by rising oil
prices in the United States since the beginning of the eighties.
To provide a first assessment of the link between oil prices and interest rates, we can have a look
at the evolution of those two variables in the euro area since the beginning of the nineties. Figures
(1) and (2) display the dynamics of oil prices and the short-run interest rates. In the first graph, we
plot the short-run interest rate 3. It is rather difficult to recover the theoretical positive link between
oil prices and interest rates during the nineties. Indeed, oil prices exhibited a rather stable trend until
1999 while interest rates decreased. The correlation coefficient is equal to 0.23 (0.34 with oil prices
in U.S dollars). From the end of the nineties, the correlation is still present but we observe a delay in
the monetary policy’s reaction.
Figure 1: Real oil prices and interest rates in Europe (1990:1 - 2008:12)
Sources: Data from OECD, IEA and IMF.
We zoom on this period which coincides with the beginning of the EMU in the graph (2). The
figure confronts the main interest rates and oil prices still expressed in the domestic currency. We
3German between 1990 and EONIA between 1995 and 2008, since the behaviour of the Bundesbank has largely
inspired the ECB) before 1999 and in the euro area since its completion.
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note that if interest rate follows the oil shock of 1999, it remains unchanged between june 2003 and
november 2005 in spite of an upward revival of oil prices in 2004. This long-lasting oil shock ends
in july 2008 with a barrel of Brent equal to 133 dollars (84 euros). ECB modifies its monetary stance
from december 2005 and progressively rises the main interest: 25 basis points every two months.
We thus observe a delay in the response of monetary policy and the fluctuations of oil prices. We
can interpret this delay in two ways. The delay could be first explained by the expectation of a
temporary oil shock. The second explanation might be a pure disconnection between both variables.
The monetary policy would be influenced by others factors like asset prices, labor costs or exchange
rate. The second explanation appears more convincing for two reasons. Firstly, if oil prices constitute
an indicator of future inflation, the Central Bank should react immediately by raising its interest
rate to an increase in oil prices. However, oil prices have almost doubled between april 2003 and
october 2004. Secondly, the disequilibrium on the oil market between supply and demand suggests
that the increase in oil prices could not be transitory and that oil prices are on an upward trend. The
tightening of the monetary policy corresponds to the improvement in economic situation in Europe.
ECB referred to inflationary pressures of oil prices after 2006 for the next oil shock which happened
between 2007 and 2008. ECB would achieve its initial objective of anchoring inflation expectations
at a low level from the start of EMU by reacting immediately to inflationnary shock.
Figure 2: Oil prices and main refinancing interest rate in the euro area (1999:1 - 2006:12)
Sources: Data from OECD, IEA and IMF.
All in all, it appears that the correlation between interest rates and oil prices is not as obvious
as suggested by theoretical considerations. The influence of oil prices in the ECB decision-making
may have been hidden by other factors, especially the appreciation of the euro-dollar exchange rate
(alleviating the costs of imports and imported inflationary pressures) and the low levels of economic
growth during the years 2003 to 2005. The likelihood of high inflation pressures and second-round
effects should be viewed as lower during low-growth periods.
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More generally, we may wonder if energy prices are still a good indicator for future inflation in
the euro area, and thus quickly pass-through into overall consumer price inflation or core inflation.
Figure (3) displays the evolution of real oil prices, HICP inflation, and core inflation in the euro area4.
It appears that HICP inflation fluctuated closely with the evolution of oil prices until 2005. In
the same way, core inflation reacted with a slight lag to real oil prices and HICP inflation in the
beginning of the period. However, the correlation between oil prices and HICP inflation seems to
have weakened since 2005, and core inflation did not react to the strong and long-lasting rise of
the oil prices. As suggested above, the weakening of the oil price-inflation relationship may come
from the improvement in monetary policy by the gains in credibility, or from an alleviation of the
wage-inflation spiral in European countries during low-growth periods.
Figure 3: Real oil prices, HICP inflation and core inflation in the euro area (1997:1 - 2008:12)
Sources: Data from OECD, IEA and IMF.
An econometric evaluation of the ECB reaction function would therefore be useful to investigate
the effective role played by oil prices in its monetary policy strategy, taking into account the evolution
of other inflationary indicators such as the output gap and money growth.
4We define core inflation as the overall Consumer Price Index without energy and unprocessed food prices.
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3 GMM estimates of an extended Taylor rule
3.1 The framework
Our model relies on a Taylor rule to describe the behaviour of Central Banks, which has become a
standard since the seminal paper from Taylor (1993). This reaction function relates the shifts in the
short-term nominal interest rate to the deviations of inflation and output from their target levels. The
basic Taylor rule thus takes the following form:
it = i¯+β (pit −pi∗)+ γ(yt − y∗) (1)
where i∗t is the desired short-term nominal interest rate, i¯ its long-run equilibrium value, pit the inflation
rate and yt the output gap. pi∗ and y∗ are respectively the targets for the inflation rate and the output
gap, which are both supposed constant over time. The coefficients β and γ can be interpreted as the
relative weights assigned by the Central Bank to inflation and output stabilization respectively. We
must note that the β coefficient plays a major role in the ability of the Central bank to temper inflation,
and further in the stability of the system, as illustrated by Taylor (1999) and Woodford (2001). Taylor
"principles" say that β must be higher than unity for central Banks that focus on price stability in their
monetary strategy.
Clarida, Gali & Gertler (1998) try to improve the standard framework to get a more realistic
rule in two dimensions. Firstly, they propose a forward-looking variant of the Taylor rule, in order
to take into account the prospective behaviour of central bankers5. However, we do not want to
use such a forward-looking rule in our investigations, since we are interested in the specific role
played by oil prices in the strategy of the ECB. In fact, taking an expected inflation term in the ECB
reaction function would entail a problem of collinearity with current oil prices, which are essentially
an indicator for future inflation. That’s why we concentrate in this Section on the estimation of a
contemporaneous reaction function for the ECB, with only current values of all variables.
Secondly, Clarida et al. (1998) introduce a smoothing component in the interest-rate setting be-
haviour of central bankers. The monetary authorities indeed try to avoid a disturbing volatility of
interest rates, since overly abrupt and frequent changes may create trouble in the equity and bond
markets, and also affect the credibility of central bankers6. A reaction function incorporating such a
smoothing behaviour may be written as:
it = ρit−1+(1−ρ)[i¯+β (pit −pi∗)+ γ(yt − y∗)] (2)
5Since monetary policy only affects output and inflation after several months, it is likely that central bankers focus on
expected future inflation rather than current or past inflation.
6Sack & Wieland (2000) provide a deeper investigation of the reasons explaining the need for interest rates smoothing.
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where the ρ parameter (with 0≤ ρ < 1) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing.
Since our objective is to assess the role of oil prices in the ECB monetary policy strategy, we can
not simply use this standard reaction function, but instead we have to choose an extended Taylor rule
intended to be closer to the official "two-pillar strategy" designed by the ECB. That’s why we include
in our baseline reaction function four additional indicators supposed to convey information about
future inflation: money growth (∆mt) that constitutes the "monetary-analysis pillar" of the ECB’s
strategy, the euro-dollar nominal exchange rate (∆et), an interest rate spread (st) and an indicator for
oil prices (∆ot) that are contained in the "economic-analysis pillar". The extended reaction function
thus takes the following form:
it = ρit−1+(1−ρ)[i¯t +β (pit −pi∗)+ γ(yt − y∗)+θ∆mt +η∆et +κst +λ∆ot ] (3)
An empirical variant of our reference interest rate rule (3) may be written as:
it = α1+α2it−1+α3(pit −pi∗)+α4yt +α5∆mt +α6∆mt +α7∆et +α8st +α8∆ot + εt (4)
The dependent variable it is a proxy for the target short-term nominal interest rate, namely the
monthly average of the EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average), the day-to-day interest rate in the
euro area. pit is the inflation gap, i.e. the difference between the monthly annualized HICP inflation
rate and the inflation target of the ECB set to 2%. yt is the output gap, measured as the monthly de-
viation of the Index of Industrial Production (IPI) from a trend calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter set to 14 400 (standard value for monthly data). ∆mt is money
growth minus the ECB target equal to 4.5%, constructed as the 12-month growth rate of the monetary
aggregate M3. ∆et is the monthly averaged change rate of the bilateral exchange rate. Finally, st is
the difference between two different terms: long-run interest rates (10-years government bonds) and
the 3-months interest rate (Euribor).
Finally, ∆ot is an indicator for oil price variations. Since our aim is to investigate the role of oil
prices in the ECB monetary strategy and assess a potential asymmetric and/or nonlinear behaviour of
the ECB regarding oil prices, we construct several indicators that will be alternatively introduced in
our reaction function. Our baseline indicator is the 12-month variation of nominal oil prices expressed
in euros (denoted as ∆ot). To investigate for potential asymmetries in the ECB reaction to oil prices,
we distinguish between increases and deceases of nominal oil prices, i.e. between positive (∆o+t ) and
negative (∆o−t ) values of our baseline indicator7. Finally, we construct an indicator for Net Oil Price
Increases (NOPI), as initiated by Hamilton (1996), to assess a potential non-linear reaction of the
7These two measures are also used by Mork (1989) to evaluate the linearity of the oil price-output relationship after
the big decrease in real oil prices in 1985.
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ECB to oil prices increases. It allows for a distinction between oil price increases that really account
for a shock relative to recent experience and increases that simply reverse recent decreases8. We build
the symmetric indicator with decreases called: NOPD.
We also test the robustness of our results with alternative variables of activity and inflation. We re-
place the industrial production by the unemployment rate on which we apply the Hodrick and Prescot
filter to obtain the fluctuations around its trend. HICP inflation is replaced by the core inflation indi-
cator that excludes prices of energy and food. A second exercise of robustness consists in including
additional variables that enter in the second pillar and influence ECB’s decisions: asset prices (with
the EUROSTOXX 50 index) and the interest rate spread between the U.S. and the euro zone. A
detailed description of the series and data sources is provided in Appendix A.
The regression coefficients of Equation (4) are related to implied coefficients in Equation (3)
according to the following form: α1 = (1− ρ)i¯ ; α2 = ρ ; α3 = (1− ρ)β ; α4 = (1− ρ)γ ; α5 =
(1−ρ)θ ; α6 = (1−ρ)η ; α7 = (1−ρ)κ; and α8 = (1−ρ)λ .
Finally, εt is an error term which reflects stochastic disturbances, i.e. monetary policy shocks.
Those disturbances represent the part of shifts in interest rates that are not explained by deviations of
prices, output, money growth and oil prices.
The estimation of the reaction function is based on the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM)
estimator in order to avoid some econometrics caveats relative to more traditional methods and par-
ticularly OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Firstly, the OLS estimator hurts to a problem of
likely correlation between contemporaneous variables and the error term, which leads to biased es-
timates of the related coefficients. Moreover, several explanatory variables (notably current inflation
and the output gap) are probably unobservable for the ECB in real time. That’s why those variables
need to be instrumented. Secondly, unlike traditional instrumental variables estimators such as the
TSLS, GMM estimators do not require any assumption about the exact distribution of the error terms
(i.e. normality, non-autocorrelation and homoskedasticity)9.
We specifically use here the two-step efficient GMM estimator, initiated by Hansen (1982) and
Hansen & Singleton (1982). Standard errors associated with coefficient estimates are computed using
the procedure defined by Newey & West (1987), which provide a consistent estimator in case of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (HAC covariance).
The only required condition for GMM estimates is the selection of instruments uncorrelated with
the residual term. Good instruments should also be highly correlated with our right-hand side vari-
8Hamilton (1996) uses this indicator to investigate non-linearity in the relationship between oil prices and output, and
shows that it helps recovering the Granger-causality in this relationship.
9GMM estimators nest and generalise many common estimators such as OLS and TSLS, as explained in Wooldridge
(2001).
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ables. In our estimates, we use two lags of all explanatory variables as instruments. The choice of a
small number of instruments is intended to minimize the potential small-sample bias that may arise
when too many over-identifying restrictions are imposed. The relevance of instruments is assessed
using the Hansen-Sargan test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis
is that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e. orthogonal to the residuals) and that the estimated
model is correctly specified. Under the null, the test statistics follows a chi-squared distribution with
the number of over-identifying restrictions for degrees of freedom.
3.2 The ECB reacts asymmetrically to oil prices
The period of observation begins in January 1999 and finishes in December 2008. We thus have 120
observations. The results are reported in Table 1. The first column displays the results of the standard
rule, the second includes the variation rate of oil prices ∆ot , and the last two columns are related to
the "asymmetric" and "non-linear" indicators of oil prices.
We shall note that the fit of our regressions is quite good since the adjusted R2 is always around
0.9810. The choice of instruments seems to be relevant since the p-value of the Hansen-Sargan test
indicates that we can never reject the joint null hypothesis of valid instruments and correct specifica-
tion of the model. The p-value of the Cragg-Donald test indicates however that the instrument set is
sometimes weak (in [2] and [4]).
The estimation of a reaction function without oil prices can be used as a benchmark. It appears that
the coefficients associated to ρ , β and γ are in line with the results reached in other recent empirical
studies devoted to the ECB monetary policy rule11. It appears that the coefficient on inflation is
positive but never significant. As for the coefficients associated to the output gap and exchange rate,
they are perfectly in line with previous findings and theoretical assumptions. The ECB thus seems to
use cyclical developments to assess future inflation and reacts accordingly in order to maintain price
stability. The instantaneous reaction of the ECB to the output gap is rather great since it exceeds 0.5
(the reference according to Taylor "principles"). We note that the response of the ECB to exchange
rate variations is in line with theoretical assumptions since it expresses the quantity of foreign currency
for a unity of domestic currency. The central Bank thus rises the interest rate when the exchange rates
depreciates in order to maintain the value of the currency. The money growth rate is only significant
in the third regression, whereas the interest rate spread does not enter significantly.
10The lagged value of the short-run interest rate plays a key role.
11Cf. for example Fourçans & Vranceanu (2004, 2007), Gerdesmeier & Roffia (2004, 2005) and Sauer & Sturm (2007).
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Table 1: Extended Taylor rule - GMM estimates (1999:1-
2008:12)a
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0.319*** 0.127 0.204* -0.0183
(0.108) (0.104) (0.112) (0.137)
it−1 0.890*** 0.943*** 0.919*** 0.964***
(0.0283) (0.0263) (0.0310) (0.0328)
(pi−pi∗) 0.0017 -0.0179 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0320) (0.0257) (0.0244) (0.0363)
y 0.0866*** 0.0729*** 0.0925*** 0.0739**
(0.0194) (0.0254) (0.0204) (0.0308)
∆m 0.0187 0.0115 0.0069 0.0214**
(0.0126) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0108)
∆e -0.0073*** -0.0117 -0.0231* -0.0299**
(0.0026) (0.0180) (0.0119) (0.0145)
s -0.0045 0.0026 -0.0064 0.0328
(0.0299) (0.0308) (0.0294) (0.0373)
∆o 0.0013**
(0.0006)
∆o+ 0.0015**
(0.0007)
∆o− -0.0012
(0.0025)
NOPI 0.0239**
(0.0117)
NOPD 0.0129
(0.0166)
Implied coefficients
ρ 0.89 0.943 0.919 0.964
β 0.0155 -0.3140 0.021 0.0472
γ 0.7873 1.2789 1.142 2.0528
λ - 0.0228 - -
λ+ - - 0.0185 0.6639
λ− - - -0.0148 0.3583
Observations 117 117 117 117
R¯2 0.976 0.978 0.975 0.962
Hansen J-test 5.436 7.48 8.624 6.003
[0.365]b [0.169] [0.281] [0.0671]
Cragg Donald Stat 34.91 10.83 29.87 14.61
[0.000]c [0.146] [0.001] [0.539]
a We report the results reached using the two-step GMM estimator with the
Newey & West (1987) correction. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
b p-value of the Hansen test for the null hypothesis of valid instruments.
c p-value of the Cragg-Donald test for the null hypothesis of weakness of
instruments.
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The introduction of oil prices in the ECB reaction function suggests that this variable influences
significantly the monetary policy in the euro area. The results demonstrate that the variation rate of
oil prices plays a role in the ECB’s decisions regarding interest rates: an increase in oil prices would
be a risk to price stability for upcoming months. The third regression confirms our assumption of an
asymmetric behaviour of the ECB, since the simultaneous introduction of variables ∆o+t and ∆o−t (for
increases versus decreases in the oil price) yield significant parameters. It thus illustrates a non-linear
reaction of the Central Bank: the ECB reacts only when price stability is threatened, i.e. in case of
rising oil price. Column 4 suggests that the ECB is really sensitive to the greatest oil price increases
considered like true oil shocks and captured by the NOPI indicator, and not to the biggest decreases
(NOPD). The difference between ∆o+t and NOPI is large since in the first case, a 200% increase in
oil prices is needed to see a 25 basis points increase in main interest rate, whereas a 10% increase in
NOPI is enough for the same monetary tightening.
The estimated coefficients allow for the evaluation of the impact of the monetary policy on output
after an oil shock. A 50% increase in oil prices entails a rise in interest rate equal to 7.5 basis
points. According to the Area Wide Model (AWM) from Fagan et al. (2001)12, the impact of a 100
basis points increase in interest rate would lower the real GDP from 0.34 percentage points below its
reference value the first year, and 0.71 percentage points the two next years. Such a policy would also
cut inflation rate from 0.15 percentage points the first year, 0.30 and 0.38 the second and third years.
We can thus assess the impact of the monetary tightening on activity to 0.05 percentage points during
the two first years. In return, such a monetary policy reduces the inflation rate to 0.08 percentage
points below the target, in the same delay. Even if the impact on output seems low, we have to
remember that it constitutes a partial and transitory effect13.
Results of the alternative estimates can be found in Tables 9, 10, 12 and 11 in Appendix B. In
Table 9, it appears that oil price are less significant. The coefficient associated to the price of Brent
is however greater in the second regression [2] (0.0039). The ECB remains watchful to (∆o+t ) but
not anymore to (NOPI). In Table 10, the estimates reveal a major role for the unemployment gap:
when current unemployment is above its trend level, the ECB is more inclined to an accommodative
monetary policy. Oil prices demonstrate a greater role in the definition of the monetary policy when
the authorities are worried by the unemployment rate. The three additional variables demonstrate a
relative proximity with the baseline results. We note that the coefficient associated to the smoothing
parameter diminishes, that oil prices are less significant when we include the interest rate spread with
the U.S. All these findings allow us to conclude to a quite good robustness of our results, and give
some credit to an asymmetric and non-linear behaviour from the monetary authorities regarding oil
prices.
Finally, we evaluate the predictive power of our models by comparing the estimated interest rate
12See papers from Morgan & McAdam (2001) and van Els et al. (2001) for a larger comparison of the effects.
13Impacts would be higher with the coefficient associated to the NOPI.
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and the actual one. We analysis it based on a graphic way and statistical indicators of the discrepancy
between the estimation and the observation. Figure (4) provides a dynamic forecasting of the short-
term interest rate using our reference reaction function with confidence intervals. We first observe
that oil prices improve the EONIA forecasting. The path of the EONIA is far from the actual interest
rate while it is closer in the three other models. The second model seems to be the better model
because it has well predicted both the accommodative stance in 2001 and the tightening at the end
of the period (with a small delay). Model [3] underestimates the low interest rate between 2003 and
2005, whereas model [4] overestimates the tightening monetary policy in 2007. It suggests that ECB
remains relatively insensitive to the oil prices.
Figure 4: Out-of-sample dynamic forecasting
Model [1] Model [2]
Model [3] Model [4]
Statistical indicators of the errors of predictions reported in the table2 corroborate the observations
from graphs above. The second model presents the lower average error whereas the model [1] displays
the worst statistics of discrepancy between estimated interest rate and the observed interest rate.
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Table 2: Indicators of predicting errors
Model [1] Model [2] Model [3] Model [4]
Root Mean Square Error 1.254 0.463 0.519 0.567
Mean Absolute Error 0.989 0.366 0.426 0.399
Mean Absolute Percentage Error en % 36.238 18.338 14.646 12.441
In spite of its success, GMM contains a drawback associated to the instrumentation. In the next
section, we use another methodology which allows for estimating the interest rate directly activated
by the ECB: an ordered Probit Model.
4 Ordered Probit estimates
Another way to investigate the role of oil prices in monetary policy decisions is to estimate the reaction
function using an Ordered Probit model. In fact, GMM estimates of our extended reaction function
were using the monthly average of the EONIA as the instrument of the ECB. For large samples,
this is likely to be a good approximation, since the ECB controls the overall path of the day-to-day
rate. However, there are temporary deviations of the EONIA from the rate of the Main Refinancing
Operations (MRO) directly under the ECB control, and those deviations are rather hard to explain,
as noted by Carstensen (2006). Therefore, the use of the EONIA interest rate may have entailed
an additional noise in our regressions, especially on a small sample as ours. That’s why we want
to check our results in this Section using directly the ECB MRO rate. Since this rate is always set
at multiples of 25 basis points, a simple regression model for continuous dependent variable would
not be appropriate. We thus use an Ordered Probit model that is designed for "censored" dependent
variables. Since the seminal paper from Eichengreen et al. (1985), the estimation of monetary policy
reaction functions by means of Ordered Probit models has become increasingly popular. Examples
of their diffusion include Gali et al. (2004), Carstensen (2006) and Gerlach (2007).
4.1 The Ordered Probit model
Within our Ordered Probit model, the monthly decision of the ECB regarding its interest-rate setting
is represented as a choice among three modalities: a cut in the MRO rate (-1), no change (0) and
an increase of the MRO rate (+1). Table 3 indeed shows that the ECB did not modify its main
refinancing rate very often during the period 1999:1-2008:12 (only 27 times for 110 observations).
Since the number of 25-basis-point cuts and 50-basis-point increases is very limited, we decide not
to discriminate between the scope of increases and decreases, and thus only model three possibilities,
like Heinemann & Huefner (2004). We finally get 16 increases and 11 decreases.
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Table 3: Shifts in the monetary policy instrument (1999:1-2008:12)
25 basis points 50 basis points Total
Increases 14 2 16
Decreases 3 8 11
Statu-quo - - 93
The decision of the ECB is therefore defined as a choice among three possibilities:
∆it =−1 if it−1−n2 < i∗t < it−1−n1
∆it = 0 if it−1−n1 < i∗t < it−1+ p1 (5)
∆it = 1 if it−1+ p1 < i∗t < it−1+ p2
where i∗t would be the optimal interest rate if it could be set on a continuous scale, which is conse-
quently unobserved. pi (ni) represents the scope of the positive (negative) shift in the interest rate.
The specification of the ECB reaction function is very close to the specification used for GMM
estimates in the previous Section. Nevertheless, we regress the interest rate on the lagged value of
inflation, output gap and monetary growth. We assume that those variables are currently unobservable
and that no instrumentation is used here. The expression of the target level for the interest rate iTt is
simply:
iTt = c+α1(pit−1−pi∗)+α2yt−1+α3∆mt−1+α4∆et +α5st +α6∆ot + vt (6)
Assuming that the ECB proceeds to a gradual adjustment of the actual interest rate, as in Judd &
Rudebusch (1998), we get the following dynamic expression for the desired interest rate i∗t :
i∗t − it = β0(iTt − it−1)+β1∆it−1+ εt (7)
Combining (6) and (7) and incorporating the fact that the ECB only sets its interest rate in steps
yield the following expression:
i∗t − it = γ1(pit−1−pi∗)+ γ2yt−1+ γ3∆mt−1+ γ4∆et + γ5st + γ6∆ot −β0(it−1)+β1∆it−1+ εt (8)
where the constant term is omitted, γi =αiβ0 for i=1 to 4, and εt = β0vt . i∗t may therefore be defined as
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a latent unobservable variable, and Equations (5) and (8) constitute the Ordered Probit model which
can be estimated since all regressors are observed.
4.2 An oil price increase rises the probability of restrictive monetary policy
Table 4 reports the results of our estimates. The main results are rather in line with those discussed in
the previous Section on the basis of GMM estimates, especially regarding the role of the output gap
and oil prices in the ECB interest-rate setting process14. The exchange rate’s fluctuations lost their
influence, whereas the inflation deviation, the monetary growth and the interest spread remain non-
significant. The inclusion of oil prices in the reaction function does not entail major changes to the
baseline results, though slightly improving the fit of the model. The results suggest an asymmetric
behaviour of the ECB with respect to oil prices, since the coefficient related to increases (pos) is
significant, while the one related to decreases (∆o−t ) is still non significant (column 3). However, the
results reached using the Ordered Probit model do not yield a particular role for the NOPI indicator
(column 4).
Table 5 displays the marginal effects for each variable and specification. The marginal effects are
the change in the probability of each modality (-1, 0 and +1, i.e. respectively decrease, no change
and increase in the MRO rate) for a one-unit change (a one-percentage-point change in our case) in
the explanatory variable (calculated for mean values of explanatory variables). The computation of
marginal effects thus allows us to interpret and compare the impact of small changes of each variable
on the ECB decision15. For example, it appears that a one-percentage-point increase in the output
gap reduces the probability of a cut in the interest rate by 0.055 and increases the probability of a
tightening of monetary policy by 0.087, if we refer to our baseline specification without oil prices. In
the other specifications, we observe that rising oil prices raise significantly the probability of a tight-
ening of monetary policy (0.002 in [2]) and reduce the probability of a more accommodative stance
(−0.001). The asymmetric pattern is confirmed in the third regression where only ∆o+t affects the
probabilities of a modification in interest rates. Beyond the validation of GMM results, we recover
the hierarchy of the tasks dedicated to the ECB. Indeed, the european authority excludes an accom-
modative policy and promotes the stability price. The ECB would not fear the deflation pressure
associated to a decrease in oil prices but only the inflationnary effect of an oil shock.
14It also appears that the interest rate level influence the ECB decisions: the Governing Council may be more inclined
to increasing its key interest rate when it is initially low, and conversely to cut it when the initial level is rather high. On
the other hand, the parameter related to lagged change in the interest rate is not significant whatever the specification,
suggesting that a change in the key interest rate would not influence the decision of the following month.
15Obviously, the most probable event is in each case that the ECB keeps unchanged its MRO interest rate, as clearly
indicated by the last line of Table 5.
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Table 4: An extended Taylor rule: Ordered Probit estimates
(1999:1-2008:12)a
[1] [2] [3] [4]
it−1 -0.708*** -0.631*** -0.682*** -0.663***
(0.222) (0.218) (0.226) (0.230)
∆it−1 0.281 -0.0099 -0.0009 0.218
(0.256) (0.254) (0.255) (0.265)
(pit−1−pi∗) -0.186 -0.356 -0.344 -0.185
(0.291) (0.296) (0.299) (0.286)
yt−1 0.517*** 0.460*** 0.477*** 0.476***
(0.138) (0.146) (0.148) (0.160)
∆mt−1 -0.0189 0.0828 0.0693 -0.0027
(0.0791) (0.0850) (0.0869) (0.0781)
∆e -0.0640 -0.0348 -0.0326 -0.0709
(0.0506) (0.0502) (0.0490) (0.0505)
s -0.351 -0.350 -0.408 -0.351
(0.298) (0.287) (0.284) (0.303)
∆o 0.0163***
(0.0043)
∆o+ 0.0180***
(0.0057)
∆o− 0.0093
(0.0135)
NOPI 0.0059
(0.0307)
NOPD 0.0581
(0.0446)
Observations 119 119 119 119
Pseudo R2b 0.170 0.241 0.243 0.179
Log-likelihoodc -68.02 -62.20 -62.08 -67.29
Correct predictionsd 94 97 99 95
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2, which is appropriate to assess the
quality of the estimation.
c LR statistic for testing the restricted model against the most general
model.
d Number of observations for which the model has well predicted the de-
cision of ECB.
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As with the GMM estimator, we examine the robustness of our results for alternative indicators
of inflation and activity, namely core inflation and the unemployment gap. The results are reported
in Tables 13, 14, 15 and 16 in Appendix C. The estimates are very close to those reached with our
benchmark indicators. All in all, it appears that our conclusions relative to oil price indicators are
rather robust. The more important modifications are found with the core inflation. We observe that
core inflation coefficients are significant in [1] and [4], with a counter-intuitive sign. Exchange rate
and the monetary growth deviation enter significantly. Both interest rate spread with the U.S and asset
prices influence the decision of the ECB. The increase in asset prices and higher U.S interest rates
conduct the european Bank to lead a more restrictive monetary policy. Oil prices play an important
role in the interest-rate setting process of the ECB, and their effect seems to be asymmetric: oil
price increases influence its decision setting (and tend to increase the probability of a tightening of
monetary policy), not oil prices decreases.
Table 6: Actual ECB decisions ver-
sus predictions of Ordered Probit
modelsa
[1] Realized
-1 0 1 Total
-1 2 0 0 2
Predicted 0 9 92 16 117
1 0 0 0 0
Total 11 92 16 119
[2] Realized
-1 0 1 Total
-1 3 0 0 3
Predicted 0 8 92 14 112
1 0 2 2 4
Total 11 92 16 119
[3] Realized
-1 0 1 Total
-1 2 0 0 2
Predicted 0 9 90 13 112
1 0 2 3 5
Total 11 92 16 119
[4] Realized
-1 0 1 Total
-1 2 1 0 3
Predicted 0 9 91 16 116
1 0 0 0 0
Total 11 92 16 119
a The bold numbers describe the coincidences between
the prediction of the model and the effective decision
of the ECB.
In order to assess the quality of prediction of our models, we report in Table 6 a summary of pre-
dictions of each model against effective ECB’s decisions. The models help in predicting the decisions
of the ECB to leave unchanged its interest rate, but overestimate the probability of this modality (with
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between 112 and 117 predictions of status quo, against 92 observations of no-change in the MRO
rate). Conversely, Ordered Probit models largely underestimate the probabilities of an increase or
decrease of the MRO interest rate. Over 16 increase and 11 decreases, our models predict only three
shifts (3 decreases in the first model and three increases in the third regression) All in all, it appears
that the model is not very efficient in predicting shifts in the monetary stance, which is in line with
previous results from Carstensen (2006) and Gerlach (2007).
5 Two potential explanations of the asymmetric response
The asymmetric reaction of the monetary authorities can be explained in two ways. First, the ECB
could expect a nonlinear relationship between energy prices and overall inflation or expected inflation.
Then, Central Bank could have asymmetric preferences and be particularly watchful to price level.
We assess those two potential explanations.
5.1 Oil prices and expected inflation
The variation of oil prices lead policymakers to revise their inflation expectation. Rising oil prices
create inflation pressures that could force the authorities to conduct a restrictive policy. On the other
hand, it does not fear deflation when the energy prices declines. We perform a bivariate Granger
causality test (Granger, 1969) for each oil prices indicator constructed and prices’ expectations in-
cluded in the SPF (1 and 2 years ahead) and The economist data set. This test will be informative on
the potential causal relation and notifies the way in which energy prices translate into expectations.
pi ft = α1+
l
∑
i=1
ζ (l)pi ft−l +
l
∑
i=1
θ (l)ot−l + ε1,t (9)
ot = α2+
l
∑
i=1
ω(l)ot−l +
l
∑
i=1
ξ (l)pit−l + ε2,t (10)
where l is the maximum number of lagged observations whose contributions are displayed by the
coefficients ζ , θ , ω and ξ .
To examine Granger causality from oil prices on expectations, we only test the following hypoth-
esis:
θ (l) = 0
If it could not be rejected, inflation expectations are independent from oil prices. Indeed, the past
values of oil prices change are not statistically different from zero and thus do not explain the current
level of inflation anticipations. We are therefore in a purely autoregressive process since only past
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values of expectations affect the current expectation. If we reject the hypothesis, there is causality
from the former variable to the latter. The results of the tests critically depend on the lags we retain
(see Thornton & Batten (1985)). In this paper, we set the number of lags (l) to unity. We economically
justify our choice by the delay during which expectations could be affected by the evolution of oil
prices. We can accept this assumption because oil prices can shift immediately the predictions of
policymakers. It will be longer concerning the actual inflation rate. Moreover, this specification
minimizes the AIC criteria. Table 7 reports the results of the test.
We can reject the null hypothesis that oil prices do not Granger-Cause inflation expectations in
three of the four cases. We note that crude oil prices change rates (∆ot , ∆o+t and ∆o−t ) turn out to be
good predictors of expectations since the significance levels of the associated statistics are below 5%.
Only the NOPI indicator, with a P-value above 10%, would Granger-Cause the anticipated inflation
of the SPF two years ahead. The two others indicators do not display any asymmetric response to
∆o+t and ∆o−t . Those results indicate that oil prices do not influence asymmetrically the construction
of the expectations of the future price level. The justification of the ECB’s asymmetric behaviour is
thus elsewhere.
Table 7: Bivariate Granger-Causality tests for oil prices and inflation expectationsa
H0 SPF one year ahead SPF two years ahead The Economist
∆o does not "granger" cause pi f 11.0497*** 1.08236 9.23935***
∆o+ does not "granger" cause pi f 7.49422** 1.05518 4.10485**
∆o− does not "granger" cause pi f 9.45812*** 0.54312 19.1923***
NOPI does not "granger" cause pi f 1.52211 5.10047** 4.18974**
NOPD does not "granger" cause pi f 0.16084 0.45426 9.62645***
a The statistic represents a F-test of θ = 0 in (9), with 1 the number of lags and 118 degrees of freedom.
5.2 Is there a preference for price stability?
The second explanation holds on the preferences of European policymakers. Indeed, policymakers
could assign different weights to their objectives of inflation and output gap in the setting of the policy.
We know for instance that price stability is the main objective in the euro area, and that authorities are
more concerned about overshooting inflation target (pi∗). We can thus think that the dilemma created
by a supply shock like an oil shock is not so difficult to solve. It is more plausible that the ECB apply
a restrictive policy when oil prices raise rather than an accommodative policy which would maintain
the activity around its potential. We evaluate the supposed "inflation bias" of the ECB on the basis of
the work of Surico (2004) and an optimization problem. The quadratic loss function follows:
Lt =
1
2
[(pit −pi∗)2+ η3 (pit −pi
∗)3]+
λy
2
[y2t +
κ
3
y3t ]+
λi
2
(it − i∗)2 (11)
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The cubic specification allows treating positive and negative deviations of inflation and output
from the target and the potential level. We expect a positive sign for η since overshooting pi∗ generates
a loss for policymakers. Conversely, κ should be negative since authorities are more concerned by an
output contraction (i.e a negative output gap) which diminishes the welfare.
This function is minimized regarding two constraints representing the functioning of the economy:
pit =ΘEtpit+1+ψyt + εst
yt = Etyt+1−φ(it −Etpit+1)+ εdt (12)
They correspond respectively to an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand relation. The
first equation is a New-Keynesian Phillips curve which captures the feature of a Calvo-type prices in
which each firm adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period independently from
the last change. The second equation, in turn is an IS schedule which exhibits the notion of smoothing
adjustment since the output gap is a positive function of the value expected in the next period.
The problem of the Central Bank is to set the interest rate at the period t upon the information
available in t-1. It gives:
min
it
Et−1
∞
∑
τ=0
δ τLt+τ (13)
Where δ is a discount factor and L stands for the period loss function.
We obtain the first order conditions16:
−ψφEt−1(pit −pi∗)− ηψφ2 Et−1(pit −pi
∗)2−φλyEt−1yt − φκλy2 Et−1y
2
t +λi(it − i∗) = 0 (14)
We finally estimate the reduced form of the resulting equation which looks like an optimal Taylor
rule extended with quadratic terms:
it = α0+α1Et+k[pi−pi∗]+α2yt +α3(Et+k[pi−pi∗])2+α4y2t +ρit−1+ vt (15)
We only regress the interest rate on inflation gap (difference between the actual inflation rate and
the inflation target 2%) and the output gap to recover the seminal rule of Taylor (1993). Inflation
term is under a forward-looking specification since we consider that the ECB react to the inflation
rate expected. We use this forward looking specification because we want to assess different horizons
regarding to inflation objective. The ECB determines the monetary policy and expects effects on the
16For calculation details, see Surico (2007). We only report here the reduced form of the estimated equation.
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economy between six and 12 months later17. The parameters capturing nonlinearity on inflation (η)
and on activity (κ) are respectively contained in α3 and α4:
α3 ≡ ηφψ2λi and α4 ≡
λyκψ
2λi
We estimate equation (15) using the General Method of Moments (GMM) with a Newey-West
estimate of the covariance matrix. Two lags of each explanatory variable and two lags of the main
interest rate are set as instruments. The table 8 presents the results.
Table 8: Nonlinear Taylor rule (1999:1-2008:12)a
k=k’=6 k=k’=12 k=6; k’=3 k=12; k’=6
α0 0.1178 0.0440 0.1567*** 0.0412
(0.0964) (0.0764) (0.0536) (0.0605)
ρ 0.9266*** 0.9814*** 0.9374*** 0.9994***
(0.0399) (0.0306) (0.0212) (0.0254)
α1 0.4807*** 0.1935** 0.1168 0.0098
(0.1213) (0.0974) (0.0892) (0.1285)
α2 0.1269*** -0.0010 0.1351*** 0.0403
(0.0287) (0.0211) (0.0327) (0.0541)
α3 0.2051*** -0.1088 0.1070*** -0.1591
(0.0536) (0.0789) (0.0338) (0.0457)
α4 -0.0212 0.0029 -0.0112 0.0033
(0.0195) (0.0175) (0.0115) (0.0119)
Observations 111 105 111 105
R¯2 0.9125 0.9683 0.9655 0.9769
Hansen J-test 3.089 6.084 5.832 6.767
0.543b 0.193 0.212 0.149
a We report the results reached using the two-step GMM estimator
with the Newey & West (1987) correction. Standard errors are in
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively.
b p-value of the Hansen test for the null hypothesis of valid instru-
ments.
We first compare two equations with two different horizons (k=k’=6 and 12) with k the horizon
for inflation and k’ for output gap. We also estimate the nonlinear Taylor rule by differentiating the
horizons (k=6, k’=3) and (k=12, k’=6). The second regression does not demonstrate any asymmetric
preferences. But the first one with inflation expectation of 6 month ahead shows that the ECB is
particularly sensitive to the evolution of the level of price. Indeed, α3, associated to the quadratic
17No other variable (like oil prices) will influence inflation expectations.
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term of inflation is significant whereas the coefficient capturing nonlinearity in activity is not. We
precise that α3 displays the predictive positive sign. We recover this nonlinear preference when
inflation expectations are set to 6 months and output gap to 3 months. The results confirm that
european policymakers are more preoccupied by an inflation deviation from its target than an output
contraction since it is more costly in for the authorities’ welfare. The inflationary pressures generated
by an oil price increase conduct the authorities to lead a tighter monetary policy in spite of the negative
effects of the shock on activity. This conclusion is of course valid for all kind of supply shock and
thus for oil shock.
The asymmetric behaviour relative to oil prices found in the two previous sections are mainly
justified by nonlinear preferences of the ECB on price stability. The oil prices which affect infla-
tion expectations do not translate asymmetrically since both positive and negative change rates help
Granger-Cause the predictions. The deviation of inflation rate from the target entails a welfare loss
in a greater magnitude than an output contraction. This result validates the ECB’s alarms when oil
prices increase and explains why it rather insists on the risks for the price level and not with out-
put. The ECB’s behaviour can be justified by the distribution of tasks assigned to authorities by the
political process of the EMU. The monetary authority manages with the common hand of the oil
shock, inflation pressures, but let fiscal policies of the EMU members face to real effects (specific
hand). Moreover, an accommodative stance would limit recession consequences for some countries
but reinforce the inflation increase in others due to asymmetrical effects of the monetary policy in the
EMU.
6 Conclusion
This paper was intended to evaluate the role played by oil prices in the ECB monetary policy strategy.
To this end, we perform estimates of the ECB reaction function using an extended specification of a
Taylor rule, incorporating alternative indicators of oil prices. It appears that oil prices play a rather
important role in the ECB interest-rate setting process, as expected and announced by the ECB itself
when the Members of the ECB Board claim that oil prices are an important element of the "economic
analysis" and a relevant indicator of future inflation. However, the ECB seems to react asymmetri-
cally: only oil price increases influence its decision setting, not oil prices decreases. Those results are
rather robust since they hold for the two alternative methodologies used in this paper for the estima-
tion of the ECB reaction function: a GMM framework and an Ordered Probit model. This behaviour
is explained by the preference of the ECB on inflation deviation from the target. The energy prices
can push up the inflation rate above the 2% and force the authorities to react to preserve the stability
price. Our estimates assess that the response of the ECB, after an oil price increase equal of 50%,
"costs" 0.05 percentage points of the real GDP relative to its potential level in two years, while it
reduces the inflation rate from 0.08 percentage points in the same delay.
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This paper thus reports evidence of a nonlinear and asymmetric behaviour of the ECB as regards
the evolution of oil prices. Those results do not mean however that European policymakers are at the
root of the asymmetry in the relationship between oil prices and output. Monetary policy may rather
be viewed as an element of transmission and amplification of this asymmetry.
In future works, we intend to extend and deepen this analysis in several directions. Firstly, it would
be interesting to assess the existence of a threshold in oil price growth which warns policymakers and
decides them to modify the monetary stance in order to avoid inflation. Secondly, it would be useful
to compare our results reached using monthly data on a rather short-time sample with estimates on
pre-euro data. Quarterly data on a "fictive" euro area, extended to the eighties and nineties, would be
instructive. In the same way, a comparison with the practice of the U.S. Federal Reserve as regards
the evolution of oil prices should provide some interesting insights into the difference in the conduct
of their monetary policy. Finally, the construction and the estimation of an explicit model of the econ-
omy, with aggregate demand and supply reactions to the monetary policy, would help in investigating
the interactions between oil prices, inflation, monetary policy and economic activity.
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Appendix A: Data and the construction of oil indicators
For GMM estimates, we use the monthly average of the EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average) as
a proxy for the short-term nominal interest rate. For the Ordered Probit modelling, we use the rate of
Main Refinancing Operations (MRO), which is the key interest rate of the ECB. Data are provided on
the ECB Website.
We use the HICP inflation index (all items) basis 100 in 2005 and comes from the OECD Main
Economic Indicators. For robustness checks, we also use an indicator of core inflation, which is the
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices eXcluding food and energy prices (HICPX). Those series are
not adjusted for seasonality and are extracted from the same database. The forecast of inflation rate in
the euro area is extracted from the ECB’s survey data through the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF), and from the review "The Economist". For the SPF, a questionnaire asks for a point estimate
of what specialists expect inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment to be over specific time
horizons, together with probabilities for different outcomes.
As for our indicator of economic activity, it is constructed using the Index of Industrial Production
(IPI), which is available at a monthly frequency (unlike GDP, only available on a quarterly basis). Our
baseline proxy for the output gap is the monthly deviation of the IPI from a trend calculated using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter set to 14 400 (standard value for monthly
data). For robustness checks, we also use a measure of the "unemployment gap", calculated as the
monthly deviation of the unemployment rate from a trend obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Seasonally-adjusted series of IPI and unemployment rate are extracted from the OECD Main Eco-
nomic Indicators.
The "monetary analysis" indicator is constructed as the 12-month growth rate of the monetary
aggregate M3, which is provided on the ECB website.
The "economic analysis" pillar is represented by the euro-dollar nominal exchange rate and the
interest spread between long-run and short-run interest rates. We use the monthly average growth rate
of the bilateral exchange rate. The spread results from the difference between each monthly value
of the Yield 10-years government bond and the 3-month EURIBOR. All data are extracted from the
OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Finally, oil prices are extracted from the International Energy Agency (IEA) database and repre-
sent the Brent spot prices on the Rotterdam market. Our baseline indicator is the 12-month variation
of nominal oil prices expressed in euros (denoted as ∆ot). To investigate for potential asymmetries in
the ECB reaction to oil prices, we distinguish between increases and decreases of nominal oil prices,
i.e. between positive (∆o+t ) and negative (∆o−t ) values of our baseline indicator. We also construct
an indicator for Net Oil Price Increases (NOPI), as initiated by Hamilton (1996), to assess a potential
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nonlinear reaction of the ECB to oil prices increases. It allows us to filter out oil prices increases in
a context of high volatility which can affect the perception of the actors. When the oil price level of
the current month exceeds the value of the previous year’s maximum level, the NOPI is equal to the
percentage change between the two "peaks". For all other values of oil price variations (negative as
positive), the NOPI indicator is equal to zero.
The robustness checks lead us to include additionnal variables: asset prices, the spread of interest
rate between the U.S and the euro zone. We use the EUROSTOXX 50 index (basis 100 in 2005) as
a proxy of the first variable and the difference between the day-to-day interest rate of the euro area
(EONIA) and the Fed Funds rates set by the Federal Reserve. The data still come from the OECD
Main Economic Indicators.
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Appendix B: Robustness checks for GMM estimates
Table 9: GMM estimates with core inflationa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0.111 0.134 0.226 0.0142
(0.148) (0.165) (0.165) (0.179)
it−1 0.931*** 0.934*** 0.911*** 0.957***
(0.0329) (0.0349) (0.0383) (0.0375)
p˜i -0.0579 0.1090 0.0130 0.0426
(0.0550) (0.1090) (0.0580) (0.0718)
y 0.0937*** 0.0813*** 0.0991*** 0.0802**
(0.0265) (0.0310) (0.0210) (0.0311)
∆m 0.0177* 0.0126 0.0068 0.0252*
(0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0103) (0.0130)
∆e -0.0253 -0.0269 -0.0252* -0.0467***
(0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0128) (0.0164)
s 0.0337 0.0086 -0.0076 0.0348
(0.0319) (0.0422) (0.0387) (0.0473)
∆o 0.0039*
(0.0022)
∆o+ 0.0017*
(0.0010)
∆o− -0.0019
(0.0027)
NOPI 0.0263
(0.0167)
NOPD 0.0274
(0.0192)
Implied coefficients
ρ 0.931 0.934 0.911 0.957
β -0.8391 1.6515 0.1461 0.9907
γ 1.358 1.2318 1.1135 1.8651
λ - 0.0591 - -
λ+ - - 0.0191 0.6116
λ− - - -0.0213 0.6372
Observations 117 117 117 117
R¯2 0.974 0.968 0.974 0.948
Hansen J-test 3.426 0.327 3.477 2.184
[0.489] [0.042] [0.000] [0.454]
Cragg Donald Stat 10.14 9.885 26.48 7.792
[0.071] [0.955] [0.001] [0.479]
a See notes in Table 1.
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Table 10: GMM estimates with unemployment gapa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0.583*** 0.337*** 0.344** 0.378
(0.155) (0.123) (0.149) (0.250)
it−1 0.849*** 0.902*** 0.898*** 0.890***
(0.0345) (0.0256) (0.0366) (0.0626)
(pi−pi∗) 0.0626** 0.0047 0.0116 0.0479
(0.0292) (0.0265) (0.0305) (0.0457)
U−U∗ -0.0549*** -0.0409*** -0.0444*** -0.0434**
(0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0212)
∆m -0.0271** -0.0104 -0.0112 -0.0161
(0.0117) (0.0099) (0.0113) (0.0161)
∆e -0.0291** -0.0078 -0.0146* -0.0265**
(0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0085) (0.0124)
s -0.0505 -0.0398 -0.0378 -0.0335
(0.0369) (0.0303) (0.0327) (0.0334)
∆o 0.0020***
(0.0004)
∆o+ 0.0021***
(0.0006)
∆o− 0.0014
(0.0022)
NOPI 0.0193*
(0.0106)
NOPD 0.0033
(0.0124)
Implied coefficients
ρ 0.849 0.902 0.898 0.89
β 0.4146 0.048 0.1137 0.4355
γ -0.3636 -0.4173 -0.4353 -0.3945
λ - 0.0204 - -
λ+ - - 0.0206 0.1755
λ− - - 0.0137 0.03
Observations 117 117 117 117
R¯2 0.972 0.980 0.978 0.966
Hansen J-test 3.893 9.205 9.632 4.967
[0.421] [0.001] [0.000] [0.113]
Cragg Donald Stat 21.52 23.85 56.17 11.65
[0.000] [0.002] [0.210] [0.548]
a See notes in Table 1.
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Table 11: GMM estimates with asset pricesa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0.0264 0.236* 0.334** 0.0886
(0.133) (0.124) (0.166) (0.145)
it−1 0.974*** 0.898*** 0.876*** 0.928***
(0.0353) (0.0344) (0.0466) (0.0360)
(pi−pi∗) 0.0421 -0.0737 -0.0243 -0.0271
(0.0318) (0.0499) (0.0346) (0.0460)
y 0.0614** 0.0968*** 0.107*** 0.0938***
(0.0276) (0.0207) (0.0258) (0.0302)
∆m 0.0056 0.0206 0.0059 0.0255**
(0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0116) (0.0121)
∆e -0.0162 -0.0252* -0.0292** -0.0334**
(0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0149)
s 0.0309 0.00921 -0.0268 0.0329
(0.0283) (0.0323) (0.0386) (0.0353)
∆a 0.00217 -0.0185 -0.0107 -0.0125
(0.0012) (0.0145) (0.0117) (0.0109)
∆o 0.0015**
(0.0006)
∆o+ 0.0022**
(0.0009)
∆o− -0.0034
(0.0031)
NOPI 0.0224**
(0.0112)
NOPD 0.0087
(0.0099)
Implied coefficients
ρ 0.974 0.898 0.876 0.928
β 1.6192 -0.7225 -0.1959 -0.3764
γ 2.3615 0.9490 0.8629 1.3028
λ - 0.0147 - -
λ+ - - 0.0177 0.3111
λ− - - -0.0274 0.1208
Observations 117 117 117 117
R¯2 0.978 0.963 0.968 0.956
Hansen J-test 6.853 4.679 7.543 6.653
[0.335] [0.699] [0.247] [0.102]
Cragg Donald Stat 14.83 9.135 11.44 14.60
[0.038] [0.359] [0.479] [0.574]
a See notes in Table 1.
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Table 12: GMM estimates with interest rate spread with the U.Sa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0.0126** 0.0713 0.132 -0.0267
(0.1153) (0.108) (0.117) (0.120)
it−1 0.9692*** 0.962*** 0.949*** 0.978***
(0.0241) (0.0223) (0.0274) (0.0263)
(pi−pi∗) 0.0766* 0.0059 0.0256 0.0767**
(0.0393) (0.0501) (0.0486) (0.0335)
y 0.0588*** 0.0576*** 0.0699*** 0.0535**
(0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0179) (0.0235)
∆m 0.0042 0.0072 -0.0021 0.0079
(0.0095) (0.0099) (0.0091) (0.0095)
us -0.0461*** -0.0101 -0.0084 -0.0432***
(0.0111) (0.0189) (0.0199) (0.0142)
s -0.0434 0.0092 -0.0099 0.0461
(0.0317) (0.0341) (0.0368) (0.0312)
∆o 0.0012
(0.0008)
∆o+ 0.0017*
(0.0010)
∆o− -0.0015
(0.0023)
NOPI 0.0021
(0.0125)
NOPD 0.0050
(0.0139)
Implied coefficients
ρ 0.969 0.962 0.949 0.978
β 2.488 0.154 0.499 3.474
γ 1.917 1.515 1.363 2.422
λ - 0.03
λ+ - 0.033 0.096
λ− - -0.029 0.228
Observations 119 119 119 119
R¯2 0.979 0.980 0.979 0.979
Hansen J-test 6.445 10.06 13.24 8.261
[0.265]b [37.34] [0.067] [0.220]
Cragg Donald Stat 13.009 6.982 3.313 0.534
[0.000]c [0.000] [0.000] [0.337]
a See notes in Table 1.
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Appendix C: Robustness checks for the Ordered Probit
Table 13: Probit estimates with core inflationa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
it−1 -0.931*** -0.909*** -0.866** -0.886**
(0.340) (0.335) (0.342) (0.344)
∆it−1 0.0262 -0.0860 -0.103 -0.113
(0.283) (0.271) (0.266) (0.309)
(p˜it−1) -0.856** -0.562 -0.618 -0.893**
(0.418) (0.432) (0.464) (0.427)
yt−1 0.608*** 0.579*** 0.565*** 0.527***
(0.177) (0.180) (0.186) (0.192)
∆mt−1 0.168* 0.173* 0.192** 0.192**
(0.0930) (0.0914) (0.0962) (0.0938)
∆e -0.0424* -0.0387* -0.0400* -0.0479**
(0.0225) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0213)
s -0.172 -0.228 -0.165 -0.196
(0.320) (0.303) (0.317) (0.323)
∆o 0.0096*
(0.0056)
∆o+ 0.0076
(0.0076)
∆o− 0.0155
(0.0132)
NOPI -0.0189
(0.0316)
NOPD 0.0753
(0.0501)
Observations 119 119 119 119
Pseudo-R2 0.262 0.282 0.283 0.279
Log-Likelihood -60.49 -58.87 -58.79 -59.09
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2, which is appropriate to as-
sess the quality of the estimation.
c LR statistic for testing the restricted model against the most gen-
eral model.
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Table 14: Probit estimates with unemployment gapa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
it−1 -1.284*** -1.311*** -1.395*** -1.186***
(0.287) (0.315) (0.335) (0.316)
∆it−1 0.528** 0.186 0.200 0.466*
(0.246) (0.256) (0.257) (0.260)
(pit−1−pi∗) 0.146 -0.0351 -0.0097 0.125
(0.273) (0.302) (0.309) (0.275)
Ut−1−U∗ -0.343*** -0.367*** -0.379*** -0.313***
(0.0833) (0.0964) (0.0951) (0.0981)
∆mt−1 -0.212** -0.0960 -0.120 -0.179**
(0.0875) (0.0959) (0.103) (0.0868)
∆e -0.0520 -0.0341 -0.0306 -0.0540
(0.0535) (0.0516) (0.0518) (0.0523)
s -0.801*** -0.803*** -0.900*** -0.758**
(0.304) (0.310) (0.330) (0.303)
∆o 0.0190***
(0.0042)
∆o+ 0.0213***
(0.0058)
∆o− 0.0099
(0.0149)
NOPI 0.0134
(0.0314)
NOPD 0.0470
(0.0429)
Observations 119 119 119 119
Pseudo-R2 0.156 0.250 0.252 0.162
Log-Likelihood -69.20 -61.48 -61.30 -68.67
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2, which is appropriate to assess
the quality of the estimation.
c LR statistic for testing the restricted model against the most general
model.
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Table 15: Probit estimates with asset pricesa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
it−1 -0.264 -0.292 -0.340 -0.663***
(0.300) (0.291) (0.338) (0.230)
∆it−1 -0.462 -0.577* -0.563* 0.218
(0.309) (0.312) (0.314) (0.265)
(pit−1−pi∗) 0.591 0.423 0.433 -0.185
(0.364) (0.375) (0.370) (0.286)
yt−1 0.317* 0.313* 0.328 0.476***
(0.182) (0.188) (0.200) (0.160)
∆mt−1 0.0203 0.0889 0.0780 -0.0027
(0.0880) (0.0937) (0.0938) (0.0781)
∆e 0.00157 0.0148 0.0170 -0.0709
(0.0567) (0.0564) (0.0552) (0.0505)
s -0.177 -0.210 -0.267 -0.351
(0.316) (0.311) (0.324) (0.303)
∆a 0.0508*** 0.0465*** 0.0468***
(0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0123)
∆o 0.0113**
(0.00488)
∆o+ 0.0127**
(0.0064)
∆o− 0.0062
(0.0151)
NOPI 0.0059
(0.0307)
NOPD 0.0581
(0.0446)
(1.401) (1.371) (1.504) (1.094)
Observations 119 119 119 119
Pseudo-R2 0.322 0.348 0.348 0.179
Log-Likelihood -55.57 -53.46 -53.41 -67.29
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2, which is appropriate to assess
the quality of the estimation.
c LR statistic for testing the restricted model against the most general
model.
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Table 16: Probit estimates with the interest rate spread with
the U.Sa
[1] [2] [3] [4]
it−1 -0.489** -0.505** -0.525** -0.459*
(0.244) (0.239) (0.256) (0.253)
∆it−1 -0.171 -0.275 -0.269 -0.206
(0.325) (0.314) (0.312) (0.336)
(pit−1−pi∗) 0.809** 0.541 0.541 0.791**
(0.357) (0.381) (0.381) (0.353)
yt−1 0.443*** 0.438*** 0.445*** 0.411***
(0.138) (0.144) (0.152) (0.159)
∆mt−1 0.0740 0.128 0.124 0.0801
(0.0892) (0.0881) (0.0916) (0.0876)
us -0.618*** -0.529*** -0.526*** -0.610***
(0.133) (0.154) (0.154) (0.134)
s 0.161 0.0478 0.0241 0.150
(0.324) (0.317) (0.320) (0.329)
∆o 0.0107**
(0.0049)
∆o+ 0.0113*
(0.0064)
∆o− 0.0083
(0.0150)
NOPI 0.000
(0.0317)
NOPD 0.0376
(0.0412)
Observations 119 119 119 119
Pseudo-R2 0.291 0.314 0.314 0.294
Log-Likelihood -58.14 -56.26 -56.25 -57.88
a Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
b The pseudo-R2 is the Mac Fadden R2, which is appropriate to assess
the quality of the estimation.
c LR statistic for testing the restricted model against the most general
model.
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